



Commonwealth Legal Assistance News

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NEWSLETTER OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT'S CRIMINAL LAW SECTION

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W was accused by the United Kingdom Department of Customs and Excise of being involved in a major Value Added Tax fraud involving mobile telephones, with a loss to the Revenue Department of about £30million. A warrant was issued for his arrest for offences contrary to Section 72(8) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994, and money laundering contrary to Section 93 C(i)(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

The United Kingdom authorities requested “the provisional arrest” of W in the US, “with a view to extradition” in accordance with Article VIII of the Extradition Treaty between the two countries. An extradition request was never made. But in the meantime, the US Department of Justice proceeded to issue a provisional warrant for W’s arrest. W was arrested and taken to court the next day, when he requested that he be allowed to return to the United Kingdom voluntarily. The court refused.

At a further hearing W signed an “affidavit of waiver” in which he waived his rights under the applicable extradition treaty and petitioned the court to expedite his return in custody to the United Kingdom. The affidavit also stated that W waived his rights to an extradition hearing and agreed to return to the United Kingdom “without any promise or threats being made or any other form of inducement or intimidation being exercised on the part of any representatives, officials, or officers of the United States or of the United Kingdom, or of any person whatsoever. He executed the waiver of rights, “entirely of my own free will and accord.” He was thereafter sent to the United Kingdom accompanied by two US police officers.

Upon arrival in the UK, W was held in prison pending his trial. He applied for Habeas Corpus and judicial review on the ground that he had been extradited for offences which were not extradition crimes, and could not be tried for those offences. The

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prosecution on the other hand argued that W was not extradited, but had chosen to return to the UK and that there was therefore no obstacle to prevent him from being tried in respect of any offences.

Counsel for W submitted that the United States Authorities, W's U.S. lawyer and the U.S. Judge were all misled into believing that the offences in question were within the scope of the relevant extradition treaty when they were not. All that he waived was his right to raise arguments in the United States, and that waiver did not change the nature of the proceedings. They remained extradition proceedings, and he landed in the UK because he had been extradited. He therefore had a right not to be tried for any offence other than the extradition crimes for which he had been extradited and must be released if there were no such crimes. Alternatively W submitted that he was misled as to what would happen if he failed to return to England.

As a result of the actions of the Customs and Excise he was led to believe that if he did not return voluntarily he would be extradited. The court should therefore use its powers of judicial review to grant him relief, following the reasoning of the House of Lords in *R v Horseferry Road Magistrates Court ex parte Bennett* (1994) 1 AC 42.

Schedule 1 to the Extradition Act 1989, paragraph 17 provides:

"Where in pursuance of any arrangement with a foreign state, any person accused or convicted of an extradition crime is surrendered by that foreign state, such persons shall not until he has been restored or had an opportunity of returning to such foreign state, be triable or tried for any offence committed prior to the surrender in any part of Her Majesty's Dominions other than such of the said crimes as may be proved by the facts on which the surrender is grounded."

It was common ground that the offences alleged are not extradition crimes.

➔ **Held:**

1. In the absence of a request for extradition, W could not be said to be a person accused of an extradition crime. Besides, the final words of the paragraph could not operate when there were no facts on which the surrender was grounded other than W's decision in the United States to waive his rights under United States law.

Counsel for W relied on *Barton v. Commonwealth of Australia* [1974] 131 PLR 477 which concerned a request for the detention of two Australian citizens who were in Brazil, pending a request for extradition. Although Australia had no extradition treaty with Brazil reliance was placed on the residue of the royal prerogative. The Court opined *inter alia*, that the word "arrangement" in the relevant legal provision was not limited to the case of a treaty but included an arrangement evidenced by the surrender in response to a request. W had sought to rely on this opinion to argue that the same wide interpretation should be adopted in respect of paragraph 17 of Schedule 1 to the 1989 Act.

However, the Court held that what was contemplated in *Barton* was nothing less than an ad hoc agreement between states, not simply an agreement between relatively junior officials of state bodies.

A person who is only provisionally arrested has no entitlement to the specialty rule. His entitlement is to be freed within a relatively short time if no request is made for his extradition, and meanwhile to have the benefit of legal advice, which he can then decide for himself whether or not to follow.

The court sided with approval the dictum of Lord Diplock in *R v. Governor of Pentonville Prison ex parte Sotiriadis* (1975) AC 1 at 25H, that:

"A person arrested on a provisional warrant is not at this stage subject to extradition at all and may never become so. He becomes subject to extradition only when a requisition for his surrender has been received by the Secretary of State. Although the provisional warrant charges him with an offence committed abroad the charge is as yet inchoate. It is not yet the subject of the judicial hearing for which the Act provides. There may never be a requisition for his surrender or, if there is, it may not be for the same crime as that with which the provisional arrest charges him or it may be for other crimes as well. He ought not to be kept in custodial limbo indefinitely, entitled neither to a hearing of the case against him nor to be set at liberty. So the magistrate is required to fix a date by which either those charges which alone can be the subject matter of the hearing must be formulated or the prisoner released."

The reality was that W was not extradited. Having been provisionally arrested he chose not to await the initiation and determination of the extradition process. Although his options were limited as a result of his provisional arrest, he did have a genuine choice, and so far as the English authorities were concerned his position when he arrived at Gatwick was exactly the same as if he had flown unescorted on a ticket which he had purchased himself. He could be charged and detained, and the court would not regard his detention irregular. The application for Habeas Corpus therefore failed.

2. In respect of the application for judicial review, although the offences for which W was provisionally arrested were not extradition crimes, there was no obligation at that stage to identify extradition crimes, and there was no evidence before the court to suggest that those who formulated the request for provisional arrest were deliberately attempting to deceive W and/or the U.S. Authorities into thinking that if he did not agree to waive his rights he would in due course be extradited on those charges. The situation was different from that which obtained in *R v. Bow Street Magistrates ex parte Mackeson* (1981) 75 Crim. App. Rep. 24 or the case of *Bennett* where the court found a deliberate disregard of extradition procedures constituting a serious abuse of power.

W was after his provisional arrest, well aware of his right to await and contest the extradition proceedings. Whatever lack of perception led W to opt to waive his right to challenge the extradition process cannot justify intervention by the Court.

Neil Walker v. The Governor of HM Prison, Nottingham and The Commissioner of Customs and Excise, Case No CO 4954/2001 Internet cite: www.courtservice.gov.uk

Extradition – Habeas Corpus – sufficiency of evidence to support a prima facie case for extradition – on charges of theft and fraudulent false accounting the critical element of dishonesty must be present - (United Kingdom)

P applied for an order of Habeas Corpus in respect of his committal by Bow Street Magistrates' Court in proceedings brought pursuant to a request for extradition made by the Kingdom of Thailand.

At the material time P was President and Chief Executive Officer of Finance One Public Company Limited (Fin One), and the charges on which P was wanted for extradition arose out of his management of that company. The charges related to various allegations of false accounting and theft.

Although dishonesty was an essential ingredient in each charge, it was not alleged that P acted with a view to any personal gain for himself, or any one connected with him. The extradition judge dismissed the majority of the charges against P for lack of the element of dishonesty, but found evidence relevant to some of the charges, from which it was possible to impute dishonesty on P.

The case against P was that by authorising the making of advances to or for the benefit of CBA and Ekapak (subsidiaries of (Fin One)) through "disguised loans" where there was no reasonable prospect of repayment, he misappropriated Fin One's money. CBA and Ekapak were plainly insolvent and, rather than acknowledging the reality, he poured good money after bad. Counsel for P argued that there was no justification for the distinction drawn by the District Judge, and that there was no sound basis for committing him in respect of any charge. On behalf of P it was said that even if, with the benefit of hindsight, it was possible to say that he had made a commercial error, that was a long way short of saying that he was dishonest and there had to be at least *prima facie* evidence of dishonesty if he was to be properly committed by the District Judge.

➤ **Held:** allowing the application;

1. In respect of the charges of theft, the court found that factually the extradition judge was correct in his findings, but that did not of itself demonstrate dishonesty. No doubt P could if required have justified his actions to the board of Fin One or to its shareholders as a serious attempt to keep alive associated companies which, if they collapsed, would be likely to undermine Fin One itself.

In the judgment of the court, the position of Fin One in early 1997 was dire, but what was absent in any of the theft charges, was *prima facie* evidence of dishonesty.

2. Following the conclusion by the court that there was no evidence of dishonesty on the part of P, it became unnecessary to consider P's counsel's further submission that in the

circumstances of this case the actions of P which were relied upon in relation to the charges of theft were actions of Fin One, and therefore the charges could not succeed because a company cannot steal from itself (relying on *Tesco v Natrass* [1972] AC 53). In the judgment of the court, the principle was not applicable where what is alleged in the charge is that someone who is himself the directing mind and will of the company has committed a crime against the company. (see the speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in *R v Gomez* [1993] AC 442 at 496 F). The position of a defendant within a company from which he is alleged to have stolen money may, of course, as in the present case, be highly relevant in relation to the question of dishonesty and, although in general dishonesty is in the end a question for a jury, a case cannot properly be committed for trial unless there is evidence from which dishonesty could reasonably be inferred.

3. In respect of the false accounting charge, none of the witnesses called suggested that there was any dishonesty or ulterior motive in the relevant transactions. There was no evidence that anybody was misled or deceived by the documents. Whilst it would appear that the document was incorrectly completed, there is no evidence that there was any dishonesty involved, nor, in our view, could any dishonesty properly be inferred. In the court's judgment, there was not a case to answer and the District Judge was in error in committing P on those charges.

4. As regards the charges of publishing false financial statements, the relevant provision of domestic law is section 19(1) of the Theft Act 1968, which provides that where an officer of a body corporate, with intent to deceive members or creditors of that body about its affairs, publishes or concurs in publishing a written statement or account which to his knowledge is or may be misleading false or deceptive in a material particular he commits an offence.

The allegation against P in this regard was that there was a failure to record Ekapak and CBA as debtors in the accounts. The evidence of the Head of the Department responsible for compiling the accounts, supported by the auditor, was that the accounts were kept in a proper way, conformed with generally accepted accounting principles and properly reflected Fin One's financial position as at the date when they were published. In the light of that evidence it was difficult to see how a reasonable tribunal

could properly convict on the charges of false accounting. The government's expert also said that it was possible that the losses could be included in the contingent liabilities.

Moreover, in order to prove these charges it was necessary to prove –

- “1) that P knew the accounts to be misleading false or deceptive in a material particular, and –
- 2) that he intended to deceive.”

The court could find no evidence of that. There was not, therefore, a case to answer on those charges and, the District Judge ought not to have committed P on them.

Pin Chakkaphak v. Government of Thailand, Case No CO/1021/2001; Internet Cite; www.courtservice.gov.uk

Extradition – Charge of corruption – whether provision requiring accused to prove certain facts violated presumption of innocence under Article 6 of European Convention on Human Rights - Whether it was wrong, unjust or oppressive to order extradition – section 24 of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance of Hong Kong; the UK Human Rights Act – (United Kingdom)

E's extradition was sought by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) from the United Kingdom under s12(1) of the UK Extradition Act 1989. The Secretary of State ordered his return, holding that under s12 (1) and (2) of the Extradition Act, it would not be wrong, unjust or oppressive to return him.

E was wanted in Hong Kong on 6 charges of accepting an advantage contrary to s9(1) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance. The section provides that “Any agent who, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, solicits or accepts any advantage as an inducement to or reward for or otherwise on account of his (a) doing...any act in relation to his principal's affairs or business...shall be guilty of an offence”. By s24 of the Ordinance “the burden of proving a defense of lawful authority or reasonable excuse shall be upon the accused”.

E challenged the order of the Secretary of State on the ground that the reverse onus provision in s.24 of the Ordinance violated the presumption of innocence in Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights and that the

Secretary of State's consideration of the issues was flawed and asked that the matter be remitted to the Secretary of State for further consideration.

The Secretary of State in his letter to E explained the steps and test he had applied in coming to his decision, namely whether it would be wrong, unjust or oppressive to order the applicant's return: *ex parte Launder (No 1)* [1997] 1 WLR 839 at 854H-855A. He referred to "the need to consider the particular circumstances of E's case" and said that his function was not to act as a trier of fact and referred to the serious nature of the extradition crimes.

He dealt with the question of reverse onus and Article 6(2) by holding that he did not consider it to be unjust to order E's return due to the nature of the offence created by section 9 and 24 of the Ordinance. He said that there was no clear authority under the Convention to the effect that a State's responsibility is engaged if a person is returned or extradited to a jurisdiction in which any trial might violate Article 6. He relied on the European Court statement that "the Convention does not require the contracting parties to impose its standard on [third] States": *Drozdz and Janousek v France* [1992] 14 EHRR 745. The Secretary of State concluded that the provisions would not be held by the European Court to violate Article 6(2) of the Convention, because:

- "(a) the 'presumption' is rebuttable,
- (b) section 24 did not deprive Mr Elliot of all means of defending himself and
- (c) the HKSAR courts enjoy a genuine freedom of assessment at trial in deciding whether or not the advantage alleged to have been accepted by Mr Elliot was accepted without lawful authority or reasonable excuse.

It follows that the Secretary of State does not consider there to be a real risk of any denial, still less a "flagrant" denial, of Article 6 rights." In supporting the application, counsel for E submitted that the Secretary of State did not consider the facts, his reasoning was confused and inconsistent and his counsel's submissions could not be a substitute for evidence as to his reasons. Counsel relied on decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and English and Commonwealth authorities.

Counsel argued *inter alia* that *Drozdz and Janousek v France and Spain* 14 EHRR 745

emphasised the need for some assessment of possible violation even in a country not bound by the European Convention and, where something so fundamental as a reverse burden arises, some assessment was necessary. The most important element of the offence cast a burden on him in the form of a mandatory presumption on the balance of probabilities in circumstances where such a presumption was unnecessary because of the compulsory interrogation provisions of s14.

Counsel for the Secretary of State submitted that he had asked himself the right questions in accordance with *ex parte Launder No 1*, namely whether it would be wrong, unjust or oppressive to return E and had found that it would not. It was legitimate for him to approach that question by reference to the European authorities such as *Janousek* and *Soering*, dealing with extradition by reference to whether there may be a flagrant denial of justice and by reference to other European authorities dealing with reverse onus, such as *Salabiaku* and *Hoang* and the English authorities in the Privy Council and House of Lords in a domestic context. By those separate yardsticks the over-arching question of whether it was just to return E could properly be judged. There was no difference between the principle to be applied in reverse onus cases. But the broadly stated principles in *Salabiaku* as to balance had to be applied to particular facts.

➤ **Held:** *dismissing the application;*

1. The Secretary of State correctly directed himself by reference to *ex parte Launder No 1* and clearly answered the crucial question whether it was not unjust to return E to Hong Kong because of the nature of the offences created by the Bribery Ordinance. The effect of the Strasbourg jurisprudence is that there must be a clear risk of a flagrant denial of Article 6 rights in the requesting jurisdiction before extradition could be refused: *Soering and Janousek*. The Secretary of State was entitled to conclude that the HKSAR courts enjoy freedom of assessment at trial and there was no real risk of any denial, still less a flagrant denial, of Article 6 rights. Moreover, he was right to also conclude that *Lee Kwong-kut* and *ex parte Kibilene* did not demonstrate that ss9 and 24 of the Bribery Ordinance would be held incompatible with the provisions of the United Kingdom Human Rights Act.

2. It was not necessary for the court to embark on the unenviable task of seeking to

reconcile express and implied divergences of view between members of the House of Lords in the opinion in *Lee Kwong-kut* and the judgments and speeches in *ex parte Kebilene*. The task of the Secretary of State was to decide whether E's return to Hong Kong would be wrong, unjust or oppressive; the court's role was to decide whether the reasons he gave for concluding that it would not, could be impeached.

3. As *ex parte Kebilene* made clear in a non-extradition context, issues affecting fairness of trial are, usually, best decided at the trial itself. In the court's judgment, that principle applied also in an extradition context, unless there were special circumstances, such as a real risk of denial of a fair trial at the hands of the requesting state. In the present case, therefore, the Secretary of State was right to point out that he was not a trier of fact and to stress the importance of local factors. He had proper regard, when considering the fairness of the presumption, to its rebuttable nature and to the fact that the applicant was not deprived of all means of defending himself. He was entitled to conclude that the European authorities did not preclude extradition in the present case and that the HKSAR courts would properly consider the English authorities in relation to the presumption of innocence. His conclusion that there was no real risk of any denial in Hong Kong of Article 6 rights could not be faulted.

R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Peter ELLIOT, [2001] EWHC Admin 559; Internet Cite: www.courtservice.gov.uk

Extradition – admissibility of incriminating evidence of co-accused alleged to have been obtained by torture – Whether the approach of requesting state to admissibility creates a real risk of unfair trial – Whether in such case, the requested state can inquire into the possibility of fair trial – (United Kingdom)

R, an Algerian national, was wanted by the French government for trial in connection with a series of terrorist bombings in France in 1995. The Home Secretary ordered his extradition to France under s.12 of the Extradition Act 1989. R applied for judicial review of the decision.

The facts supporting the French extradition request alleged that following the bombings in France, one Boualem Bensaid was arrested and

interrogated by French police. Bensaid made statements which, if true, implicated R as a London-based paymaster in the terrorist network. The French government relied on Bensaid's identification of his paymaster as a man known as Ilias. Another witness identified R from a photograph as Ilias. When the applicant was arrested on 8 November 1995 in London, police found in his house, the account for a telephone line matching a telephone number that had been found in Bensaid's possession at the time he was arrested in France. Thus Bensaid's confession, which is admissible in French law against other accused persons, was a crucial element in the case against R.

R was committed by the Bow Street magistrate to await the Home Secretary's decision as to his extradition. He applied unsuccessfully, for habeas corpus, with his co-accused, Mustapha Boutarfa. Boutarfa was extradited, tried in France and sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment.

R first sought permission to appeal to the House of Lords against the refusal of habeas corpus. This petition was dismissed. A few days later he made a fresh application for habeas corpus. After some delay a hearing date was set. Six days before the set date R, on the advice of newly instructed leading counsel, decided to withdraw the application and instead to apply to the Home Secretary to exercise his statutory powers against extradition to France. The Home Secretary gave his written and reasoned decision, which was that he would order R's return. Not quite three months later the present application was lodged. The Home Secretary then decided to "revisit" the case in the light of new material produced by R's solicitors. Having done so, he concluded that his decision stood.

R's counsel submitted that the Secretary of State's decision was vitiated by a series of demonstrable errors of fact. He relied primarily on the treatment of Bensaid by the French authorities, which he claimed was critical, because unless the Home Secretary could be satisfied that Bensaid's evidence had not been obtained by means of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment he was obliged to refuse extradition. He argued further that it was improper for the Home Secretary to have considered new material in his second decision as the claimant had never had an opportunity to see and comment upon it.

The facts relied on by counsel were that Bensaid's interrogation leading to the confession

that implicated R, began immediately after his arrest in the evening of 1 November 1995. Soon after his arrest and again on the following day, B was examined by police doctors who certified him as fit to be detained. He was then arraigned before a court which extended his period of custody. Following another interview, he was again seen by a doctor, who noted substantial bruising and other marks compatible with the application of force within the previous 24 hours at three places on Bensaïd's body. The record of Bensaïd's interrogations show that it was in the next interview, on 4 November, that he began making the admissions which decisively inculpated both him and R, albeit he had earlier identified 'Ilias' as a source of funds. On 6 November Bensaïd's lawyer lodged a formal statement drawing the examining magistrate's attention to Bensaïd's injuries. There was no record in the *dossier* of any response to or investigation of this complaint; nor, for that matter, of any action on Bensaïd's doctor's report.

Counsel contended that the central point to be answered was: how did Bensaïd come to sustain the injuries if he was being restrained from escaping, and how was it that they occurred not at the time of arrest but some two days into his detention? If there was no intelligible explanation, the Home Secretary should infer that Bensaïd had been beaten up, and at a time so closely prior to the admissions which form a crucial part of the case against both himself and R as to taint them irredeemably with oppression. If so, and if the evidence was not going to be excluded at R's trial, extradition would be impermissible.

He argued further that R had been denied an opportunity to deal with potentially crucial new material obtained by the Home Secretary.

R also claimed that as an Algerian suspected of terrorist offences he faced a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in France real enough to make it impermissible on this basis alone to extradite him. Although the Home Secretary had received material from either side on this issue he did not address it specifically in his decision.

The issues for the determination of the court were:

- (a) Is the Home Secretary's initial decision of 8 October 2001 vitiated by errors of fact or deficiencies of inquiry?

- (b) If so, are these cured by his subsequent reconsideration of the decision?
- (c) In particular, was the Home Secretary required by law to disclose to the claimant the further material he obtained and relied on?"

➔ **Held:** allowing the application;

1. The Home Secretary had to determine among other things, whether the trial to be faced by R would be a fair trial. This may involve the voluntariness of the extra-judicial confessions relied on as evidence against him.

It should not, however, be readily assumed or inferred that another state, particularly a fellow member of the Council of Europe represented on the European Court of Human Rights, will deny an accused person a fair trial.

2. Questions of admissibility within the requesting state's criminal process are ordinarily for the courts of the requesting state to decide, especially where admissibility turns upon disputed issues of fact. It is only where it can be demonstrated that the approach taken by the requesting state's courts to admissibility will itself be such as to create a real risk of a fundamentally unfair trial that the principle of mutual respect stressed in *McQuire* and other decisions may have to yield. In this case the Home Secretary was required to be satisfied of at least two things: that Bensaïd's incriminating admissions may well have been the direct result of brutality, and that the French courts would not entertain, except to reject it in limine, any argument in the claimant's defence based upon this contention. If the Home Secretary concluded that these elements were established, he would have been bound to refuse extradition.

It is almost inevitable that a decision letter will be disputed and may attract the submission of further material. The Home Secretary will in most cases be entirely justified in declining to enter into further debate. But it was rightly accepted, that the further questions and materials put before the Home Secretary in response to this decision letter were such as to call for its reconsideration; and this was sought to be done by revisiting it. The unusual amount of material deployed in the case might help to explain the length of time taken by the Home Secretary in reaching his initial decision. But the court was unable to accept that the totality of the exercise had in the event adequately or fairly addressed the issues requiring decision.

3. The court said: "As to the adequacy of the total inquiry, there remain at least two questions to which, on the face of the materials eventually before him, the Home Secretary has yet to give a properly reasoned response. One is whether there was any investigation at all of the original complaint of ill-treatment of Bensaid; the other is whether the French courts, given the record now available of their later decisions in relation to Bensaid, will now entertain any request by the claimant to exclude Bensaid's confessions. From the Home Secretary's conclusions about these matters may flow other questions. For example, if the answer to the second question posed above is yes, it will be necessary to consider whether the French courts will investigate the facts. (In passing, it seems to us surprising that a satisfactory answer to these questions cannot be provided by an expert in French law.) Again, if some of the Home Secretary's conclusions are as bleak as Mr Emmerson argues they should be, the question of bad faith may arise in relation to M Moinard's affidavit."

4. On the issue of disclosure, the court had this to say:
"As to the fairness of the process, two principles come into potential conflict. One is that there has to be finality in decision-making as much as in litigation: the Home Secretary is not required to be drawn into a never-ending dialogue whenever his decision proves unacceptable to a wanted person. The other is that he must not

rely on potentially influential material which is withheld from the individual affected. This is a simple corollary of Lord Loreburn's axiom that the duty to listen fairly to both sides lies upon everyone who decides anything (*Board of Education v Rice* [1911] AC 179) and of Lord Denning's dictum that if the right to be heard is to be worth anything it must carry a right in the accused man to know the case against him (*Kanda v Government of Malaya* [1962] AC 322). An individual facing a sentence of thirty years if he is extradited and convicted can be entitled to no less consideration. Once it is accepted, as very fairly it is, that the decision letter threw up genuine issues requiring reconsideration, the principle of finality is not breached; but once it is seen that the Home Secretary made use, in reconsidering the case, of materials which were and in at least one critical respect still are unknown to the claimant, in our judgment the principle of fairness is breached. "

In the circumstances the court quashed the decision of the Home Secretary and ordered a reconsideration of his decision. The confirmatory decision was also quashed. Since a wholly fresh consideration of the issues, with proper disclosure, must follow, the court declined to consider the question of R's own safety in the hands of the French authorities. "

Ramda v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs,
Case No: CO/4894/2001; Internet Cite:
www.courtservice.gov.uk

