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The *Mens Rea* Tests for Money Laundering Offences:

Chris Howard, [1998] New Law Journal 1818 and [1999] New Law Journal 28

The aim of this article is to promote a better understanding of the *mens rea* requirements of the offence of money laundering. The writer goes about achieving this objective by critically examining the words 'knowledge' and 'suspicion' in the Criminal Justice Act 1988 of England and Wales.

The article commences with a jurisprudential exposé through case-law, of the concept of knowledge. The writer states that the decisions in *Harris* ([1997] 84 Cr. App. Rep. 75) and *Agip (Africa) v. Jackson* ([1990] 1 Ch. 265), applied the concepts of *wilful blindness* and *dishonesty* as tests to be used to define the presence or absence of knowledge in an offence. He disagrees with this approach which he sees as being unnecessarily restrictive. He argues that, on the contrary, quite a number of other cases have done away with the dishonesty test. A wider test of knowledge recognises a variety of mental states, viz:

- (a) actual knowledge;
- (b) wilfully shutting one's eyes to the obvious;
- (c) wilfully and recklessly failing to make such enquiries an honest and reasonable man would make;
- (d) knowledge of circumstances which would indicate the fact to an honest and reasonable man; and
- (e) knowledge of circumstances which would put an honest and reasonable man on enquiry" (approved in *Baden Delveaux v. Societe General* [1992] All ER p.171).

He however notes that "in the context of the money laundering offences in the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the original extensive test in *Baden Delveaux* while not being expressly disapproved, has been approached far more restrictively in recent cases. On the other hand, Article 1 of the EC Directive on Money Laundering seems to favour a more extensive test of knowledge. Given the UK's intention to adhere to the Directive, knowledge is likely to be defined in the wider context of the *Baden Delveaux* test.

In the second part of the article the author considers the element of *suspicion* in the offence of money laundering. Suspicion was included as an element of the offence into the Act to fill in the gap provided

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by the difficulties of formulating an acceptable constructive test of knowledge. The author notes the difficulties that arise in trying to define suspicion because it is a very difficult state of mind to decipher, which difficulty is further complicated by the lack of a definition of the word in the primary legislation. He however cites cases that have attempted a definition of *suspicion*, e.g. *Hussein v. Chong Fook Kam* ([1969] 3 All E. R. 1626, which held that 'the word suspicion in its ordinary meaning is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking: "I suspect, but I cannot prove"').

The Act requires that financial institutions report suspicious transactions. Failure to do so could give rise to the commission of an offence. The author

submits that this emphasis on a 'suspicion-based reporting' system, and the inclusion of suspicion as an element of the offence of money laundering, makes it relatively easy for the offence to be committed.

His conclusions are that there is great potential for professionals and employees of financial institutions to commit money laundering offences and the recommendations in the Guidance Notes of the Joint Steering Group that only "genuine doubt" be reported, does not help the problem. This is because "genuine doubt" is equivalent to belief and will be inconsistent with case-law which expressly provides that "the creation of suspicion requires a lesser factual basis than the creation of belief".

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Australia: Criminal Code Amendments

Bills to amend the Australian Criminal Code have been introduced into the Parliament. They deal with two topical issues - the first being bribery of foreign public officials and the second, contained in a chapter of the code entitled 'Offences Against Humanity' deals with slavery, sexual servitude and deceptive recruiting.

The **Criminal Code Amendment (Bribery of Foreign Public Officials) Bill 1999** creates the offence of bribing a foreign public official and prescribes a penalty of ten years imprisonment. Jurisdiction is limited to cases involving conduct within Australia's territorial jurisdiction and cases involving Australian nationals or bodies corporate incorporated under Australian law. A critical element of the offence is that the benefit given or offered is not legitimately due to the recipient or offeree. In determining whether a benefit is legitimately due or not the court must disregard the fact that the benefit may be customary, the value of the benefit and any official tolerance of the benefit. The Act specifies defences to charges which provide, inter alia, that the conduct of the official of a foreign government body occurred wholly in the place where the administration of that body is located and the person would not have been guilty of a law in force in that place.

Facilitation payments are covered and it is a defence to a bribery charge that the person's

conduct was engaged in for the sole or dominant purpose of expediting or securing the performance of a routine government action of a minor nature provided that the person makes a record of the conduct in the form set out in the Bill. The definition of 'routine government action' requires that the action does not involve decisions (or encouragement thereof) about awarding new business or continuing existing business.

The **Criminal Code Amendment (Slavery and Sexual Servitude Bill) 1999** creates offences, with a penalty of 25 years imprisonment, of intentionally possessing or exercising rights of ownership over a slave or engaging in slave trading. It also creates offences, carrying basic penalties of 15 years imprisonment, of causing a person to enter into or remain in sexual servitude or conducting a sexual servitude business. Sexual servitude occurs where a person who provides sexual services does so because of the use of force or threats. Jurisdiction over these offences is assumed where any of the conduct is engaged in outside Australia and the services are to be provided in Australia or the conduct occurs in Australia and the services are to be provided outside Australia. The offence of deceptive recruiting is also created and an offence is aggravated if the victim is under the age of 18. The Bill also contains provisions repealing the Imperial Slave Trade Acts but specifically provides that slavery remains unlawful and its abolition is maintained notwithstanding the repeals.

Evidence - Order for production for inspection - Communication between DPP and Police - Public interest immunity - Whether court to inspect document itself

G applied for an order against the police for the production of various documents for inspection in relation to his action for malicious prosecution. His malicious prosecution action resulted from his arrest and subsequent release from custody in respect of a murder charge. The plaintiff was arrested following an independent review of a murder investigation by an officer appointed to consider an allegation that police officers had been involved in the original murder. The DPP, who had been provided with various reports of the original investigation, had advised that the evidence was insufficient to justify prosecution. The reviewing officer reinvestigated the original murder. In the course of the reinvestigation he took additional statements and considered the evidence afresh. At the end of the review a report was made and the plaintiff and another were charged with murder. Subsequently, on the advice of the Crown Prosecution Service, proceedings against the plaintiff were discontinued on the grounds of insufficient evidence. The plaintiff was released from custody.

G's allegation was that the reviewing officer acted in bad faith and had instigated the prosecution so as to put pressure on him to provide evidence that would link another suspect to the murder. In pursuing the suit, G applied for the production of some documents which had been the subject of communications between the DPP and both the original investigating officer and the reviewing officer. The application was opposed on the grounds that (a) the documents were subject to legal professional privilege; (b) their inspection was not necessary for the fair disposal of the action; and (c) they were covered by public interest immunity.

☛ **Held:**

1. The general test as to whether confidential communications were subject to legal professional privilege was whether a relationship tantamount to that of client and legal adviser existed between the parties. Such a relationship may exist where the police seek the advice of the DPP.
2. In this case, the reviewing officer provided the DPP with information concerning the murder in circumstances under which he believed there was a

prima facie case for proceeding, in accordance with the public duty imposed by statute. The police were not seeking legal advice and accordingly the privilege could not attach. The court would not refuse to order production on the ground of legal professional privilege.

3. Under the rules of court there was a threshold test to be satisfied by any person seeking an order for production of documents to show that such production is necessary for the fair disposal of the action and it must be shown that there is a real possibility that the documents might contain something useful. Once the threshold test has been met the court should not refuse to make an order for production without examining the documents itself.
4. Where the documents are subject to public interest immunity, it is for the court to balance the conflicting interests - the need to do justice and the need for protection of the public interest - before deciding whether or not to make the order.

Goodridge v. Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary [1999] 1 All ER, p. 896

Corruption - Whether proof of solicitation necessary - Acceptance of gratification: knowingly, inadvertently or unwillingly? - Prevention of Corruption Act 1961, s. 4(a) (Malaysia)

The respondent was charged under sections 3(a)(1) and 4(a) of the Malaysian Prevention of Corruption Act. The relevant sections provide:

3. Any person who shall by himself or by or in conjunction with any other person -
 - (a) corruptly solicit or receive or agree to receive for himself or for any person any gratification as an inducement to or reward for, or otherwise on account of -
 - (ii) any member, officer, or servant of a public body doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter or transaction whatsoever, actual or proposed or likely to take place, in which the public body is concerned,
 shall be guilty of an offence...
- 4(a) If an agent corruptly accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or any other person, any gratification, as an inducement or reward for doing or

forbearing to do, ...any act in relation to his principal's affairs or business, or for showing or forbearing to show favour to any person in relation to his principal's affairs or business...shall be guilty of an offence...

The respondent was a local council officer who, on 11 April 1996, went with another officer to the complainant's house and posed as 'building inspectors'. They queried him about a house awning which he had erected without permission from the municipality. They informed him that he had committed an offence and would have to remove the awning. Then they told the complainant that if he gave them RM300, they would not take any action against him. He replied that he would have to discuss the matter with his father and the respondent and the other agreed to come back on an agreed date. Subsequently a series of telephone calls were received on the complainant's line from an unidentified person, but the calls were traced to the respondent's mobile phone. The complainant informed the anti-corruption authorities who laid wait on the day that the bribe money was to be handed over. On the appointed day (April 25th), the two went to the complainant's house and were given RM300 in marked RM50 notes. The money was placed in a diary that had been handed to the complainant by the respondent. When they went back to their car, they were apprehended by anti-corruption officers who recovered the money from them.

At the close of the prosecution case the judge acquitted the accused, holding that the prosecution did not prove that the person who made the phone calls was the first respondent or that the calls were made with the knowledge of the respondent. He held that the prosecution had thus failed to prove that there was solicitation of the bribe on the part of the respondent.

⊖ **Held:** allowing the appeal and setting aside the acquittal -

1. The trial court erred seriously in its findings. 'Solicitation was not an ingredient of the alleged s.4 offence. Acceptance was'. The trial judge had misdirected himself on the ingredients of the offence by requiring proof of solicitation after the 11 April meeting. The prosecution had shown that there was solicitation on 11 April and it was wrong to require proof of further solicitation. Having found that the receipt of the 'trap' money was not challenged, the court should have then proceeded to consider the whole of the evidence in order to determine whether a s.4 offence had been committed.

2. Under of the Act, the prosecution has to prove two facts: (1) that the money was paid or received; and (2) that the recipient was an employee of a public body at the time of the receipt. After that the onus shifts to the defence to prove otherwise on a balance of probabilities. These requirements were wrongly ignored by the trial judge.

3. The key word in both statutory provisions is 'corruptly'. In a statute, the word connotes 'a wrongful design to acquire some pecuniary or other advantage'. But what is or is not 'corrupt' is a question of intention.

Public Prosecutor v. Jamil bin Mahmud & Another, [1998] 4 MLJ p. 681.

Drugs - admissibility of conversations between appellants and customs officers before caution - Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) - Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, s. 78(2) - Customs Code para C10.1 (UK)

This case involves two appeals against conviction in cases where the appellants had been questioned by customs officers whilst travelling through the Green channel at the airport. In the first case the appellant was stopped by a customs officer and her identity was verified. The officer, having established that the baggage she was carrying was hers asked a series of questions regarding her involvement or suspected involvement in the offence of importing cocaine. Prior to asking the questions the officer had grounds for suspecting that the appellant had committed a drug related offence. In subsequent interviews after caution the appellant had admitted that some of her original answers to the customs officer were false.

The second appellant had been stopped by an officer who acted on the instructions of another officer. Although the instructing officer was suspicious he did not convey his suspicions to the officer who stopped this appellant. That officer, having searched the baggage and having noticed fresh riveting, arrested and cautioned the appellant. Following this caution a field test, which detected cocaine, was carried out on a substance found in the luggage.

⊖ **Held:**

1. The appropriate time to administer a caution is when, on an objective test, there are grounds for suspicion, falling short of evidence which would support a prima facie case of guilt, not simply that

an offence has been committed but also that it has been committed by the person being questioned. Once the suspicion has been formed the caution should be administered. There may be cases where the requirement that there be grounds for suspicion cannot be satisfied unless the officer is sure that the suspect can be "tied to the baggage".

2. Since the questions put to the first appellant related to her involvement or suspected involvement in a criminal offence, they amounted to an interview under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). She should therefore have been cautioned before they were put to her. In the subsequent interview after caution, she admitted that two of the answers she gave at the first conversation were false, and that formed part of the evidence relied upon by the prosecution. The trial judge should have excluded the conversations as well as the subsequent cautioned interviews that repeated the offending questions. However, as the appellant had enough opportunity at the subsequent interviews to exercise an informed choice relating to what she would say it could not be said that the subsequent interviews done under caution were tainted by the earlier irregular conversation.

3. As regards the second appellant, the officer had no suspicion that she had committed an offence and only became suspicious when she examined the suitcase. There was no breach of PACE, and the subsequent interviews could not be said to be tainted.

R v. Nelson and Rose [1998] Crim. L.R. p. 815

Disclosure of documents made during investigations - Subsequent reliance on documents in libel suit - Whether Prosecution immune from suit - whether implied undertaking to use document only for purpose disclosed.

The UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) was investigating a fraud involving US\$8 million allegedly committed by three people one of whom was a London solicitor. The money obtained from the victim passed through the hands of the appellant, an Isle of Man solicitor or through a company with which he was associated.

The SFO sought assistance with the investigation from the Attorney-General of the Isle of Man. The request sought the exercise of powers under the Criminal Justice Act 1990 (Isle of Man) to summon the appellant for an interview. At the

time the request was made there was no indication that the appellant may have been a party to the fraud. The Attorney-General issued a notice requiring the appellant to attend for interview but owing to the illness of the appellant the interview was not held on the arranged date. In the meantime the SFO officer continued the investigation and in the course of so doing spoke with an officer of the Law Society concerning the victim's claim for compensation from the solicitors' compensation fund. File notes record that by this time the Isle of Man solicitor was suspected of being involved in the fraud.

Two of the defendants in the original case were convicted, one died and the appellant (the Isle of Man solicitor) was not charged. The SFO had disclosed to the solicitor for one of the defendants unused material which included a copy of the request to the Isle of Man for assistance in the investigation and a copy of the file note recording the view of the SFO officer that the appellant was a co-conspirator and the view of the Law Society officer that he should be struck off.

The appellant commenced an action for libel which he alleged was contained in the letter published by the SFO to the Isle of Man Attorney-General, and in the file note recording the views of the SFO officer and the Law Society officer. At first instance the action was struck out on the ground that disclosure of documents to a solicitor was subject to an implied undertaking that they would not be used for any purpose other than the defence of the solicitor's client.

On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the court relying on *Mahon v. Rahn* [1998] Q.B. 424, rejected the reasoning of the court below but held instead that the documents having been brought into existence for the purposes of a criminal investigation, were immune from suit. The Isle of Man solicitor appealed further to the House of Lords.

● **Held:** dismissing the appeal -

The issue before the court relates to the extent of the two principles raised in the courts below; that is, the concept of implied undertaking and the principle of immunity from suit.

1. As regards the concept of implied undertaking, the question before the court is whether an implied undertaking is created by the disclosure of documents pursuant to the prosecution's duty at common law in accordance with the decision in *R v. Brown* [1988] A.C. 367. In the case of material disclosed by the prosecution in criminal

proceedings, the main interest in privacy and confidentiality lies at one or sometimes two removes: in the person providing the information and in the person to whom it refers. In the case of information which has not been made public like the letter and the notes, the fact that publication could have been foreseeable at the time of writing does not remove the need to preserve privacy and confidentiality as far as possible. The prosecution's disclosure, under common law, of the documents as unused material generated an implied undertaking not to use them for any collateral purpose.

2. The relevant test as to the existence of immunity from suit is necessity; i.e., there must be demonstrated some necessity of the kind that dictates that judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. 'The policy of immunity is to enable people to speak freely without fear of being sued, whether successfully or not. If this objective is to be achieved, the person in question must know at the time he speaks whether or not the immunity will attach. If it depends upon the contingencies of whether he will be called as a witness, the value of the immunity is destroyed. The Court of Appeal was right in holding that the statements which formed the basis of this case were protected by absolute immunity.

Taylor and Others v. Director of The Serious Fraud Office,
House of Lords, 29 October 1998

UK terrorist offences - legislation incompatible with Human Rights Convention - discretion of DPP to consent to prosecution - legitimate expectation of accused

In the period prior to the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) various defendants were brought to trial on charges of possession of articles or information for terrorist purposes. The trial judge ruled that the provision under which they were charged [s.16A of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989] was incompatible with the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights and the DPP was asked to reconsider his consent to the prosecutions.

The DPP took legal advice and maintained his view that there was no inconsistency. One of the defendants challenged the DPP's decision on the ground that ratification by the UK of the Convention gave rise to a legitimate expectation

that the DPP would exercise his discretion to refuse consent to any prosecution which would subsequently be held to be unsafe on the basis of a Convention ground.

➔ Held: granting declaratory relief -

It was appropriate for the Court, on a challenge to the DPP's decision confirming consent to prosecution, to review the correctness of the advice relied upon by the Director when he reviewed his decision and to offer guidance as to the proper effect of the Convention.

Ratification by the UK of the European Human Rights Convention nearly half a century ago could not give rise to a legitimate expectation in the applicant that the DPP would exercise his prosecutorial discretion in accordance with the Convention. Indeed, at the time of ratification it was believed that there would be no practical effect of British law and practice as had proved the case for many years. Neither could provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 which had not yet come into force give rise to any legitimate expectation on the part of the applicant. It would fly in the face of clear legislative intention that central parts of the Act not come into force immediately upon assent to suggest that passage of the Act should give rise to a legitimate expectation. Any statements by Ministers concerning their future conduct and those of their officials could not apply to the Director of Public Prosecutions who, like the law officers, exercises his public duty independently.

The DPP cannot disapply legislative provisions by treating them as a dead letter and the Convention, not then being part of domestic law, could not be relied on to counter, undermine, modify or emasculate the plain and unambiguous effect of primary legislation. But once the trial judge had raised the issue of inconsistency the DPP was bound to consider, in the public interest, whether proceedings should continue. He would need to take into account the probable outcome of subsequent appeals and the likelihood of convictions being quashed either domestically, once the Human Rights Act provisions had come into force, or by the European Court of Human Rights.

Because convictions could be secured under ss. 16A and 16B without the prosecution proving the actus reus and the mens rea to the criminal standards the sections as they stood violated the presumption of innocence.

Notwithstanding that the accused would be better placed to adduce evidence of intention than

anyone else, the prosecution cannot be relieved of the need to prove intention in the overwhelming majority of cases.

R. v. DPP, ex parte Kebilene and ors. R. v. DPP; ex parte Rechachi Times, 31 March 1999 (QBD): 1999 Current Law 40

Proceeds of crime - property subject to restraining orders - alleged agreement between first and second respondents disposing of property - application by first respondent for an order that the real property be transferred to the second respondent in partial satisfaction of the debt of the first respondent - whether agreement was authentic or a sham: Australia

The first respondent was charged with three drug related offences. The DPP applied for a restraining order over the first respondent's property. The court granted the order and in subsequent proceedings the restraining order was continued with additional modifications and qualifications

Committal proceedings against the first respondent and other persons were concluded and the magistrate discharged the first respondent in respect of some offences but committed him for trial in respect of two charges. The first respondent, the second respondent and Mrs Henryka Kunz (the first respondent's wife and the second respondent's mother) say that on the day after the conclusion of the committal proceedings (15 May 1990) an agreement was entered into between the first respondent and the second respondent relating to various parts of the property of the first respondent.

The restraining order expired and the applicant sought an order that the first respondent pay a pecuniary penalty. The applicant also successfully sought by way of interlocutory relief a restraining order pursuant to the Customs Act against specified property. The applicant then filed a notice of motion seeking an order that the second respondent be joined in the proceeding and that a restraining order be made against the second respondent's property.

The second respondent, relying upon a handwritten loan agreement said to have been entered into between the first respondent and himself on 15 May 1990, sought orders that shares be sold; that real property of the first defendant be charged to the second defendant and that property

be transferred from the first to second defendants. The applicant sought orders that the agreement of 15 May 1990 be set aside ab initio.

⊖ **Held:**

Insofar as the agreement dated 15 May 1990 affects or purports to deal with property which was subject to the restraint order, the Court has power pursuant to the Proceeds of Crime Act and the Customs Act respectively to set that agreement aside. On the date of the agreement the restraint order was still on foot and was operative. The fact that the magistrate discharged the first respondent from some of the offences laid against him did not have the effect ipso facto of determining or nullifying the restraint order. There is authority for the proposition that an order of a superior court of record which is irregular is not a nullity but merely voidable. Subject to any relevant statutory provision that restraining order remained operative and in force, notwithstanding the first respondent's discharge from offences, until it was discharged or terminated by effluxion of time or earlier court order.

The Proceeds of Crime Act makes specific provision in section 57 for the circumstances in which a restraining order made pursuant to s 43(2) of the Proceeds of Crime Act ceases to be in force. None of the provisions contained in s 57 allows for a restraining order to cease to have effect on the discharge of a person charged at a committal hearing. The closest provision is found in subs. 57(2)(c) but that only covers a situation where a charge is withdrawn. There is no lacuna in the legislation in this respect as it is always open to the Director of Public Prosecutions to present an indictment even though the person charged has not been committed in respect of the charge the subject of the indictment. It must be remembered that a discharge at a preliminary hearing is not an acquittal. It follows that the issues before the Court have to be considered against the background that the restraining orders are still operative and in effect.

The second respondent's case is based upon the authenticity of the agreement dated 15 May 1990 but even if it was entered into on 15 May 1990 the second respondent is confronted with the provisions of s 52 of the Proceeds of Crime Act. The applicant contends that the agreement is a sham, that it was not entered into on 15 May 1990 and that it was probably entered into in or about June or July 1998. He submits that the agreement is a contrivance to keep the interest of the first respondent in the properties referred to away from

the legal aid authorities. Even if it was accepted that the agreement was in fact signed by the first respondent and the second respondent on 15 May 1990 is still susceptible to being set aside under the provisions of s 52 of the Proceeds of Crime Act which provides, inter alia, that where a restraining order is made against property and the property is disposed of, or otherwise dealt with, in contravention of the restraining order; and the disposition or dealing was either not for sufficient consideration or not in favour of a person who acted in good faith, the DPP may apply to the court that made the restraining order for an order that the disposition or dealing be set aside. There is similar provision in the Customs Act .

There is no doubt, and it was not contended to the contrary by the second respondent, that the agreement purports to deal with the property which was the subject of a restraining order. Further the applicant contends that the dealing was not for sufficient consideration nor was it in favour of a person who acted in good faith. In such circumstances the Court is empowered to set the dealing aside as from the day on which it took place. Thus, even if the agreement was entered into on 15 May 1990 it is still subject to s 52(2) of the Proceeds of Crime Act. If it was entered into on any day other than 2 to 6 September 1990 it is subject to s 243K(2) of the Customs Act.

The evidence of the second respondent and his mother on the issue of the date upon which the agreement was signed was not accepted because of the general unreliability of the second respondent's evidence and because of inconsistencies in references to the number of shares held by him as well as inconsistent statements as to the identity of his solicitor at the time of alleged execution. The court was satisfied on the balance of probabilities, that the agreement was prepared and entered into some little time prior to 29 June 1998. Irrespective of the time or date upon which it was entered into, the agreement, or rather the document purporting to be the agreement, was a sham and a contrivance which did not record or reflect any consensual arrangement reached between the first respondent and the second respondent. The fact that it could not have been entered into on the date it bears, for the reasons to which reference has

been made has the result that there was no bargain reached between the signatories on the date on which they contend it was signed.

The court also stated that if it was wrong in its finding that the agreement was a sham and a contrivance it was still satisfied that the agreement could not have been entered into before 1993 and in those circumstances it followed that the agreement had been back-dated for the purpose of seeking to enable the first respondent and the second respondent to obtain an advantage to which they are not entitled in relation to the three properties. Accordingly the jurisdiction to set aside the agreement under either s 52 of the Proceeds of Crime Act or s 243K of the Customs Act was enlivened.

By the time the agreement was entered into the second respondent did not own the shares referred to as they had been sold. There was therefore no consideration, sufficient or otherwise for the charge over, or interest in, the three properties. To the extent to which the consideration was the use of the funds obtained from the sale of the shares, it was past consideration and therefore not sufficient consideration.

An order should be made setting aside the agreement dated 15 May 1990 as from the day on which it purported to take effect.

Director of Public Prosecutions v. Kunz [1999] FCA 302 (25 March 1999)

New Citations

R v. Taylor-Sabori reported in Crimewatch 25 is now reported in [1999] 1 All ER 160.

R v. Manning reported in Crimewatch 26 is now reported in [1999] WLR 430.