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Chairman's Presentation of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare Declaration (CMAG)

Report to CHOGM

Mr Chairman;
Commonwealth Heads of Government;
Secretary-General;
Fellow Ministers;
Ladies and Gentlemen;

1. It is an honour for me as Chairman of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare Declaration (CMAG) to present the Group's 1999 Report. I do so in the company of my colleague and CMAG Vice-Chairman, Don McKinnon, Foreign Minister of New Zealand, and in the presence of our six other CMAG Ministerial colleagues from Barbados, Botswana, Canada, Ghana, Malaysia and the United Kingdom.

2. This is CMAG's second Report to Commonwealth Heads of Government and is presented in fulfilment of the Group's terms of reference as set out in the Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme on the Harare Declaration. We were established by Heads of Government "to deal with serious or persistent violations" of the principles contained in the Harare Declaration by assessing the nature of the infringement, and recommending measures for collective Commonwealth action in response. Our Report covers CMAG's deliberations in the period since the last CHOGM in Edinburgh in October 1997, to date.

3. Since October 1997, CMAG has been working to the mandate contained in paragraphs 11 to 19 inclusive of the Edinburgh Communiqué, and focused its attention on three countries - The Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. The Group has also deliberated on the issue of CMAG's future work programme. We produced a report of this work (document number HGM(99)4) which was circulated to all Heads of Government by the Secretary-General on 14 October 1999.

4. Even as that document was being distributed, a military coup in Pakistan ousted the democratically-elected government of Mr. Nawaz Sharif. The steps to be taken in response to such a situation were set out in Millbrook, and the implementation of these was immediately initiated by the Commonwealth Secretary-General, who also readily agreed to the request of a CMAG member to convene a Special Meeting of the Group to discuss the developments in Pakistan. This was convened at Marlborough House in London on 18 October 1999. Ten days later, four of my ministerial colleagues travelled to Pakistan and the Report of their Mission was circulated for the information of all member governments on 4 November 1999, without prejudice to CMAG's own deliberations and recommendations to this Meeting.

5. CMAG met last night to review the Group's Report to CHOGM in the light of recent developments in the countries under its remit. We agreed a number of revisions to the recommendations in the printed document HGM(99)4, and the recommendations the Group wished to make on Pakistan. These are reflected in the presentation which follows.

The Gambia

6. With the transition to civilian governance in The Gambia completed, CMAG's focus on that country since October 1997 has moved to the consolidation of the transition to democracy and the upholding of the Commonwealth's fundamental political values. The Group has also recognised The Gambia's contribution to regional peace efforts and its assistance to refugees fleeing from conflict areas elsewhere in the region.

7. However, the Group remains concerned that the assurances given to Heads of Government at Edinburgh by the Government of The Gambia have not been fully met. Therefore, the Group:

  • urges Heads of Government to call for the unequivocal repeal of the Schedule to Decree No. 89 which proscribes the political activities of certain political parties and individuals in The Gambia;
  • concludes that The Gambia could be removed from its remit when the Schedule to Decree No. 89 is repealed and requests the Secretary-General to continue to keep the situation in The Gambia under review, reporting relevant developments to CMAG as he finds necessary;
  • also recommends that Heads of Government urge the Commonwealth Secretary-General to continue providing technical assistance to The Gambia to consolidate democratic processes and institutions.

Nigeria

8. At their Edinburgh Meeting, in October 1997, Commonwealth Heads of Government mandated CMAG to assess, following 1 October 1998 (the date of the scheduled completion of the Abacha transition programme) whether Nigeria had completed a credible transition to democracy and civilian government, with a view to lifting Nigeria's suspension from the Commonwealth, or considering Nigeria's expulsion from the association if Nigeria remained in violation of the Harare principles.

9. The political landscape in Nigeria, however, underwent a dramatic transformation following the death, on 8 June 1998, of General Abacha and the assumption of the office of Head of State by General Abdulsalami Abubakar. General Abubakar took a number of significant steps towards establishing the basis for a credible transition to civilian democratic rule, including the release of prominent political detainees and the institution of a new transition programme.

10. CMAG decided in October 1998 to submit an Interim Report on Nigeria to Commonwealth Heads of Government in the context of the Edinburgh mandate. In that Report, CMAG recommended inter alia that it should again assess the progress in Nigeria after the Presidential elections (27 February 1999) with a view to making recommendations to Heads of Government regarding the full return of Nigeria to the Commonwealth on the assumption of office by a democratically elected government (29 May 1999).

11. The Secretary-General constituted Commonwealth Secretariat teams to be present for the Local Government Council Elections on 5 December 1998, and the State Assembly and Governorship elections in January 1999, which reported that despite technical and logistical shortcomings, the elections reflected a credible expression of the will of the people.

12. A 23-member Commonwealth Observer Group, led by Sir Ketumile Masire, former President of Botswana, observed the elections to the National Assembly (20 February 1999) and the Presidential elections one week later. The Observer Group reported its observation of more serious irregularities in the conduct of the poll but concluded, however, that despite such deficiencies, the elections constituted "a legitimate basis for completion of the transition from military to democratic government".

13. At our eleventh meeting on 29 April 1999, CMAG warmly commended General Abubakar for the welcome change in the political atmosphere in Nigeria, and recommended to Commonwealth Heads of Government that Nigeria's suspension from membership of the association be lifted with the assumption of office by the newly-elected government of General Olusegun Obasanjo on 29 May 1999.

14. Commonwealth Heads of Government signalled their unanimous consent to this recommendation and on 18 May 1999, the Secretary-General announced the full return of Nigeria to the Commonwealth upon the inauguration of the democratically-elected Government on 29 May 1999.

15. We note that, having completed the transition to civilian democratic governance, Nigeria is no longer within CMAG's remit. We wish to pay special tribute to the Nigerian people for their manifest determination to assert their democratic rights. Finally, we recommend that Commonwealth Heads of Government promote the fullest possible international support to the Government of President Olusegun Obasanjo in its efforts to consolidate Nigeria's democratic transition.

Sierra Leone

16. The achievement of the twin objectives of democracy and peace in Sierra Leone have remained a focus of Commonwealth concerns since the Edinburgh CHOGM. CMAG's activities since then have concentrated on providing support to the transition to civilian democratic governance and its consolidation, and the pursuit of a durable peace. The Group has continued to be seized of the situation in Sierra Leone, not because it believes the Government to be in serious or persistent violation of the Harare principles, but at the request of the Government of Sierra Leone as a means of keeping the country's urgent needs for humanitarian and other assistance before the international community.

17. The Group consistently commended the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to restore the democratically-elected government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. Soon after this was achieved, five of us travelled to Sierra Leone, as an indication of the Commonwealth's solidarity with and support for the Government and people of Sierra Leone. The Mission also explored ways in which the Commonwealth could assist Sierra Leone in the task of national reconstruction and peace building.

18. CMAG has continued to support the Secretary-General's good offices role in the search for a durable peace in Sierra Leone. This has involved the Secretary-General's close liaison with the Government of Sierra Leone, ECOWAS, and the United Nations. The Commonwealth, along with the United Nations, ECOWAS, and the Organisation of African Unity, is a moral guarantor of the Lomé Peace Agreement signed between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone on 7 July 1999 and the Secretary-General's Special Envoy remains a member of the Agreement's Joint Implementation Committee.

19. The Group has also sought to assist the Commonwealth to make good its pledge to assist Sierra Leone in the tasks of reconstruction and reconciliation. In this regard, the Secretary-General has implemented the recommendations of the 1998 CMAG Ministerial Mission and the Secretariat has also participated in the International Contact Group on Sierra Leone, which is convened by the United Kingdom and is characterised by strong Commonwealth representation in its membership. We requested the Secretary-General to prepare a Commonwealth Action Plan in support of the Government of Sierra Leone, United Nations, and regional initiatives for the restoration of peace and security. This Plan is the subject of consultations with the Government of Sierra Leone and other members of the wider international community.

20. However, since we finalised our Report to Heads of Government in September, we have received reports that indicate that realising the full potential of the Lomé Agreement is under threat. Indicators of this include the very low incidence of disarmament among the various militias, particularly the former rebel groups; and the lack of progress in the work of the new political commissions established under the Agreement.

21. Given the continuing urgency of the situation in Sierra Leone, and the Commonwealth's long-standing commitment to assisting the Government and people of Sierra Leone, CMAG therefore recommends to Heads of Government that:

  • they commend the efforts of ECOWAS, and its force the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), in bringing peace and stability to Sierra Leone, and further, urge all Commonwealth members to support the newly created United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in its role of consolidating the Lomé Peace Agreement;
  • they deplore the recent violations of the Lomé Agreement, call upon all parties to it to fulfill their commitments, and demand co-operation of all groups with the process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration;
  • the Group remains actively engaged with the post-conflict recovery and peace building in Sierra Leone, in a supportive and advocacy role, receiving reports as and when necessary from the Government of Sierra Leone and through the Secretary-General;
  • the Secretary-General continues his good offices role, in consultation with the United Nations, in support of the consolidation of the Lomé Peace Agreement; and that the Secretariat remains in close liaison with other members of the international community through the International Contact Group on Sierra Leone;
  • the Secretariat pursues its discussions with the Government of Sierra Leone with regard to the provision of Commonwealth technical assistance within the framework of the Commonwealth Action Plan, and in response to any other requests from the Government of Sierra Leone;
  • Commonwealth member governments with relevant experience be urged to provide all possible humanitarian and technical assistance in the tasks of reconstruction and reconciliation to the Government and people of Sierra Leone;
  • they encourage non-governmental groups and associations within the Commonwealth family, working with their local counterparts, to lend their valuable experience and expertise in support of government, civil society, and humanitarian relief in Sierra Leone.

CMAG's Future Direction

22. CMAG recognises that it has a constructive role to play in promoting respect for the Harare Declaration. Such a role would support Section I(A) of the Millbrook Action Programme, which sets out a series of "measures in support of processes and institutions for the practice of the Harare principles", and already provides the Commonwealth Secretariat with a clearly defined mandate to promote democracy, the rule of law and good government generally.

23. The Secretary-General already renders much of this assistance and he/she should retain the discretion to decide, in the light of established Secretariat priorities and available resources, to pursue action which in his/her judgment is merited by a particular situation. At the same time, however, we believe that there may be situations in which the political weight of CMAG could be specifically invoked. CMAG could also seek to facilitate measures to support member governments in their efforts to promote and implement the Commonwealth's fundamental political values.

24. The Group therefore recommends to Heads of Government that:

  1. (i) CMAG should continue to deal with serious or persistent violations of the Harare principles, particularly where democracy and constitutional rule have been clearly overthrown in a Commonwealth member country;
  2. (ii) CMAG should also be seized of situations where there is not a complete derogation from democracy and constitutional rule, but where there is a clear breakdown of democracy, sustained abuse of fundamental human rights, or otherwise serious or persistent violations of Commonwealth fundamental political values. For example:
    Þ if national elections are postponed beyond the constitutional life of the government without the proper observance of all the prescribed constitutional provisions;
    Þ if a government bans or impedes, on a systematic and sustained basis the legitimate political activities of opposition parties, groups, individuals or the media;
    Þ if there is compelling evidence, corroborated by other recognised and independent national or international observers, of a government's systematic and widespread violation of the fundamental human rights of citizens through the abrogation of the rule of law or the independence of the judiciary.
  3. (iii) CMAG should be actively involved in promoting the Harare principles in all other appropriate ways, including in parallel with the Secretary-General's good offices and by encouraging practical programmes of assistance through the Commonwealth Secretariat.

Pakistan

25. On 12 October 1999, reports from Islamabad suggested that the democratically-elected government of Pakistan had been overthrown by a miltary coup. As required by Millbrook, the Secretary-General immediately issued public statements spelling out the implications of this for Pakistan's membership of the Commonwealth. Under the terms of Millbrook, participation in the councils of the Commonwealth - including this CHOGM - by the new military regime in Pakistan was automatically suspended pending the restoration of democracy.

26. On 13 October 1999, it was confirmed that the government of Mr Nawaz Sharif had been overthrown, and that Mr Sharif and members of his government had been taken into custody. General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of Army Staff, having designated himself as the new Chief Executive of Pakistan, proclaimed a state of emergency the following day, suspended the Constitution and the National and Provincial Assemblies, but retained the Presidency and the civilian judicial system. Martial law was not imposed.

27. At its Special Meeting on 18 October 1999, CMAG unanimously condemned the unconstitutional overthrow of the democratically elected Government of Pakistan, and agreed, at the invitation of the military regime, to despatch a mission consisting of Ministers from Canada (leader), Barbados, Ghana and Malaysia to meet with the Pakistani regime and any public figures the mission deemed appropriate: to press for a clear timetable for the restoration of democracy; to propose recommendations on the question of Pakistan's membership of the Commonwealth; and to recommend what further measures might be taken should the regime in Pakistan persist in violating the principles of the Harare Commonwealth Declaration. We asked the Mission to report back to the review meeting of the full Group held here in Durban last night, in order to allow CMAG to include its recommendations on collective Commonwealth action in its Report to CHOGM.

28. Our colleagues on the mission reported that they met with a cordial welcome in Pakistan. The importance of Pakistan's membership of the Commonwealth was emphasised at all official meetings, and there was an appreciation by the regime of the Commonwealth's preparedness to engage in a dialogue on the way forward for Pakistan.

29. It became clear during the course of the mission's exchanges that there is a strongly felt desire for change in Pakistan. Many whom the mission met also perceived a failure of the practice of democracy in Pakistan to deliver the benefits of social and economic development, or guarantee just and honest government, to the people of Pakistan. Instead, successive political leaders were accused of squandering opportunities and contributing to a prevailing ethos of corruption and abuse of power. At the same time, no claims were made that Pakistan's periods of military rule had been more successful in this regard.

30. While most of the mission's interlocutors appeared prepared to wait 'a reasonable time' for the restoration of democracy, during the transition period - and in parallel to the democratisation programme - they expected to see clear progress on the specific reform issues outlined in General Musharraf's policy statement of 17 October 1999 within a one or two-year timeframe.

31. There was a strongly held expectation that, during the transition period, the regime would uphold the rule of law and fundamental human rights, including freedoms of speech and association, and ensure due process of law for those detained in the aftermath of the military takeover. The mission received assurances from General Musharraf and other members of his administration that it would respect legal norms. In the case of Mr Sharif in particular, the administration stated that his well-being would be assured, although the mission - at Mr Sharif's choice - did not make direct contact with him. Mr Sharif and a number of his colleagues have now been formally charged with a range of offences under the Pakistan Penal Code. They will be tried in a special civilian anti-terrorist court.

32. General Musharraf's response to the mission on the critical question of when he expected to restore democracy in Pakistan fell short of an assurance that he intended to do so within the timeframe indicated by the Millbrook Action Programme. Given proposed longer-term objectives such as strengthening the economy and eradicating corruption, it was not evident how far these goals would be pursued before the military relinquished power. General Musharraf did commit his administration to some reforms that are almost immediately achievable and which represent encouraging first steps.

33. CMAG again considered the situation in Pakistan at its eve-of-CHOGM meeting on 11 November 1999 and made a number of amendments to the recommendations of the mission which are reflected below.

34. CMAG is especially concerned about the reticence of General Musharraf in setting a specified timeframe with clear, achievable objectives. Accordingly, CMAG recommends to Heads of Government that:

  • pending the restoration of democracy, Pakistan remain suspended from the councils of the Commonwealth;
  • CMAG keep Pakistan under review and continue its dialogue with the regime in pursuit of the restoration of democracy, with the possibility of a further CMAG mission within the coming year to assess progress;
  • in the light of General Musharraf's stated commitment to the final goal of the establishment of democratic governance at all levels, demonstrable benchmarks of progress would need to be apparent and would include within the first year of the period of review: the reform of electoral processes and institutions, including the establishment of a fully independent electoral commission; the introduction of functioning elected local government structures in Pakistan; and the initiation of action on other elements of the regime's reform programme;
  • Pakistan be given up to two years as the timeframe for the restoration of democracy. CMAG will make recommendations on Pakistan's membership status to Commonwealth Heads of Government at their Meeting in Canberra in 2001, unless CMAG recommends otherwise in the interim;
  • in accordance with the assurances given to the Ministerial Mission by the regime, during this period CMAG also monitor the situation with regard to the upholding of the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary; and fundamental human rights, including the freedoms of association and speech;
  • more particularly, in view of the charges now laid against Mr Nawaz Sharif and some of his colleagues, Heads of Government urge that due and transparent process of law, according to accepted international norms, be followed for Mr Sharif and all those detained in the aftermath of the coup, including ensuring their access to legal representation. In that context, the Group further recommends that CMAG be requested to monitor the trials and to immediately recommend further action in the event of any derogation from due process;
  • the Secretary-General provide technical assistance in the area of the reforms mentioned above and in support of an explicit programme of transition to civilian democratic government. Elements of this could include: assistance with the development of an anti-corruption framework, and the pursuit of international measures for combating corruption; provision of technical expertise for the reform of electoral institutions and processes; and assistance with capacity-building in other aspects of good governance, including the judiciary. I should add here that CMAG has now approved a Secretariat Action Plan for such assistance.

35. In conclusion, your Excellencies, may I take this opportunity on behalf of my colleagues and myself, to thank you for the confidence you have reposed in us, and to thank the Secretary-General and his colleagues for their diligent support to the work of the Group.

36. With these remarks, Mr. Chairman, I commend CMAG's 1999 Report and its addendum (the Report of the CMAG Ministerial Mission to Pakistan) to this Meeting.



Commonwealth Secretariat
International Convention Centre
Durban
11 November 1999

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